Discussion about reconciliation in post-World War II Germany usually centers on Hitler's Jewish victims or recently enacted programs of restitution for so-called marginalized victim groups. In this paper, I explore the largely neglected domestic reconciliation policy affecting the West German left wing in the postwar period. Initially, on a genealogical, micro-historical basis, I investigate the restitution claim files of former communist and social-democratic printing companies located in Hannover, Lower Saxony. In the light of recent nationwide discourse in Germany about anti-communist measures of the pre-unification Federal Republic of Germany, such as the so-called Berufsverbote (bans on employment of leftists), these sources document negotiations to right past wrongs and shed light on reconciliation policy during the German-German "cold civil war" that followed World War II.
I. Introduction
The past, as we know it from history, is depicted as the only possible past because this serves to justify the present order, but this arrangement is never entirely stable. 1 national resistance from their posts in the public service. Adenauer's Decree on the Political Activity of Members of the Civil Service against the Democratic Order 5 mostly targeted communists and served as the precursor for the professional bans of the 1970s and 1980s. The measure also affected former members of the resistance to Nazi rule. 6 In 1972, as a protective measure against the propaganda activities of East Germany and the related fear of overthrow by the protest movement of the 1960s, German Chancellor Willy Brandt issued the Radicals Decree (Radikalenerlass). 7 On the basis of that resolution, 3.5 million people were screened for their political orientation. Approximately 10,000 mostly leftist employees and candidates for office were removed or ruled out from holding public service positions. 8 This left deep marks in German society that have only recently received any attention at all directed at reconciliation. Until now, the work of a representative for the rehabilitation of victims of the so-called Radicals Decree (Landesbeauftragte für die Aufarbeitung der Schicksale im Zusammenhang mit dem sog. Radikalenerlass) in Lower Saxony remains unique among the states of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). 9 5 The Adenauererlass decreed a duty of loyalty to the German Constitution (Verfassungstreue) on part of public officials. In consequence, the Berufsverbote affected approximately 11,000 KPD members and their sympathizers. 6 The consequences of the double victimization of the KPD victims of Nazism remain unelaborated.
Their descendants have mentioned neuroses, severe depressions, alcoholism and suicides. The "thinkable" is here indeed unsayable and requires first and foremost explicit legal responsiveness toward its victims. 7 The official title of the so-called Radicals Decree was Principles of the Issue of Anti-constitutional Forces in Public Service, German History in Documents and Images, http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org /sub_document.cfm?document_id=898. 8 "The systematical screening of all applicants for public service positions reveals a fundamental distrust of the West German citizen's democratic reliability […] ." See Jutta Rübke, ed., Berufsverbote in Niedersachsen 1972 Niedersachsen -1990 . Eine Dokumentation (Hannover, Niedersächsische Landesbeauftragte für die Aufarbeitung der Schicksale im Zusammenhang mit dem sogenannten Radikalenerlass, 2018), 12. It was not the risk of a Communist overthrow that was the foundation for those political measures, but rather the demands for domestic reform by the protest movements of the 1960s. Not personally involved in Nazi crimes, the post-World War II generation provided a societal platform for questioning how the Nazi past was being handled. On the other hand, the fear of a Soviet invasion should not be underestimated, since Germans were separated into two ideologically opposed states. However, already in 1976, Brandt expressed regret for the issuance of the Radikalenerlass, which had led to a climate of anxiety caused by loss of social standing and inhibition of societal criticism. 9 In recent research on the Berufsverbote in Lower Saxony, the suffering of the persons affected by the professional bans and court proceedings is given voice and is linked to the social stigmatization of Communists within West Germany. Based on evaluation of critical sources, a hypothesis has been advanced that in Lower Saxony, the Berufsverbote were part of a broader counter-reform
The banning of the Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, KPD) made the impact of these measures tangible. In 1951, the West German government began to seek a ban on the KPD, which was finally realized in 1956. Recourse to history was made in order to denounce political enemies and critical voices and to satisfy hegemonic interests. Overturning of the KPD ban, which was unique in Western Europe, only began in 1968 with the emergence of the German Communist Party (Deutsche Kommunistische Partei, DKP). A generational break took place in the early 1970s, when the West German government's New Eastern Policy (Neue Ostpolitik) was adopted, and the restitution proceedings analyzed here were closed down.
In this paper, I examine the restitution claims resulting from Nazi suppression of the printing companies run by the former KPD and the Social-Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD). Those printing companies were the main assets of the KPD and SPD before the rise of national socialism in Germany, and the treatment of claims for their restitution provides evidence of the efforts at internal post-World War II reconciliation in West Germany. This paper aims to demonstrate that the restitution claims of the West German left wing and its former labor organizations were a discursive platform in the German-German cold civil war that preceded the Berufsverbote of the 1970s and 1980s.
Mainly due to the politics of remembrance, the process of internal restitution for the KPD and SPD in recompense for their persecution by the Nazis remains terra incognita. 10 Nevertheless, two different perspectives dominate the research that has been done on the SPD and KPD printing companies. In the case of the SPD, the research was commissioned mainly by the party itself. Although the SPD's studies reconstruct the history of the party's assets, they also reflect a post hoc canon of glorification of the party. 11 In opposite fashion, and due to the complexity of defensive property transactions, the history of the movement. Willy Brandt sought to discredit supporters of reform by "attesting their proximity to terrorist sympathizers and enemies of the constitution." See Rübke, Berufsverbote in Niedersachsen, 10 and 15. 10 KPD printing companies resists all attempts at its reconstruction. Its property transfers can be seen as precursors of the party's time in illegality under the Nazi regime and after the KPD ban. 12 In recent years, based on newly available sources, critical research on the SPD and the KPD restitution policies has slightly opened up the discourse about the links between national restitution and the politics of memory, which had been frozen during the German-German cold civil war. 13 Rigoll reveals that the motives for denying the parallels between the persecutions of the two parties that took place following the Adenauererlass in the 1950s and those that followed the Radikalenerlass in the 1970s cannot be blamed exclusively on the international conflicts of the time. Rigoll argues that they lie also in the personal interests of reintegrated Nazis who wished to purge the public service to prevent witnesses and victims from raising their voices against the reintegration of their former oppressors. 14 In the following part of this paper, the restitution proceedings of the KPD and the SPD are contrasted, so as to demonstrate how relations between the parties shaped the restitution process. I evaluate the course of the restitution process with the help of Elazar Barkan's theory of restitution. 15 I argue that the knowledge uncovered in the archival sources is helpful in order to pull together two opposing historical perspectives of communism -as a perverted utopia and as a shared ideology. 
II. On the Restitution Experience of the West German Left Wing
Supporting Anti-Communism with Reparations for Nazi Persecution?
The elimination of the German labor movement, which was quite strong until the advent of the Nazi regime, was a key goal of Nazi ideology in the early years of that regime. Both the KPD and SPD were declared hostile to the Reich and outlawed in 1933. The funds of the SPD and KPD invested in their printing companies had up to then supported the propagation of a free press. A Nazi publishing monopoly was built up throughout Germany with the confiscated property of the printing companies that had belonged to the SPD and KPD. Ironically, the Nazis called this process "uniformization" of the press. It started in 1931-32, when pressure on communist and social-democratic newspapers increased, but before the KPD and SPD printing companies were ultimately liquidated. 16 It was precisely in this period of semi-legality that the companies' resilience had a transformative impact on society.
The SPD printing companies belonged to one SPD-controlled holding company, Konzentration AG. Since 1925, it had coordinated more than 100 printing companies with an estimated value of 90-100 million Reichsmark (RM). 17 The KPD controlled three holding companies in 1924, which coordinated the assets of approximately 34 printing companies with an estimated value of 34 million RM. 18 After the war, the confiscated printing equipment of both the KPD and SPD was supposed to be restituted to the parties by the post-World War II German state in a measure of reconciliation. 19 In their restitution claims, representatives of the KPD and SPD had to describe to the allied occupiers' as well as to the local German restitution authorities how their property was confiscated, in order to prove the extent of their damages and that they were due to Nazi persecution. However, a relatively sudden break in the discourse of the time occurred at the end of the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s. The ensuing narrative about the German past was then reflected in West German domestic restitution policy.
According to Barkan, homeostasis is unlikely to serve as a guiding principle for resolving conflicts. 20 For the restitution claiming party, the mental image of status quo ante guides morally the negotiations. For this same moral reason, in October 1945, the central Nazi publishing company Eher Verlag was liquidated along with 61 other Nazi organizations by order of the Allied Control Council's Law No. 2. 21 The publishing house had functioned as the holding company for the Nazi press (Gaupresse) since 1934. 22 The seizure and sequestration of property the Nazis had earlier confiscated was mandated by the American occupation authorities' Military Law No. 52. These assets were an important macroeconomic factor because of their large extent. Discriminatory Nazi laws were abrogated in order to restore human rights and preserve the interests of the victims of persecution. 23 Military Law No. 52 was the precursor of later restitution laws, which were applied differently in the three western zones. 24 Nevertheless, as evidenced by the events in Hannover, the legal framework was ignored in the processing of claims for restitution of the formerly communist printing companies in West Germany.
Following the example of American occupation authorities, in May 1949 the British administration enacted Restitution Law No. 59 for Lower Saxony, 25 where the city of Hannover is located. The purpose of this law, which concerned the restitution of property identifiable to victims of Nazi oppression, was to effect the speedy restitution of property (tangible and intangible) to the widest 20 Barkan, The Guilt of Nations, 327. 21 The law was based on the declaration of the victorious nations. In order to define the control of public and private property that had been illegitimately confiscated by the Nazis, the Allied Con- Even before the KPD was banned and Restitution Law No. 59 was issued, in practice in the British zone no communist organization was recognized as eligible to claim restitution rights on behalf of the KPD. Because of so-called "uncontestable acts of state" of the British authorities, the KPD continued to lack legitimacy. This allowed the Hannover reparation authorities to ignore the KPD's status as a victim organization of the Nazis. 26 Somehow, the strategic interests involved in East-versus-West politics were put above righting of past wrongs. The representatives of the communist printing company protested against being excluded from restitution: "This would mean that exactly those who experienced in the Nazi state the biggest injustice would have the lowest protection, because the Nazi state triggered not only the sale of property to another party, but even misappropriated this property for itself." 27 In 1957, based on the banning of the KPD by the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), the West German state confiscated the property of all communist printing companies that had been built up on West German territory after 1945, using materiel brought in from the GDR. 28 This confiscation included the restitution rights of the West German communist printing companies that had claimed damage by Nazi persecution. In that way, the property of the former communist printing companies was confiscated a second time and placed under the control of the Federal Minister of the Interior. The Federal Constitutional Court's ban on the KPD was overturned in 1963, when the Federal Ministry of the Interior verbally retracted its decree of seizure. However, this retraction did not put any property back into the hands of the Communists.
In the KPD restitution case in Hannover, the Supreme Court of Restitution annulled all prior decisions of the Regional Courts that viewed the restitution claims by KPD as unsubstantiated. Its justification read: "The contested decision is based on an error of law." 29 Behind the façade of the legal disputes over the publishing houses lay fundamentally divergent worldviews. Despite the recommendations of the Supreme Court of Restitution, nothing in fact changed regarding the KPD's restitution claims in Hannover. The situation was one of a probatio diabolica, where the local restitution authorities demanded production of evidence forty years after the KPD property was confiscated by the Nazis. 30 Nevertheless, the Interior Ministry's verbal retraction of the KPD seizure notification allowed the KPD's representatives to push the limits of what was sayable:
Reading words like concealment of Communist property, property displacement and transfer, one feels as if going back in time, when combatants against the Nazi state were attacked in this way. If the claim defendant [SPD] presumes that the claimant's transfer happened only in order to protect Communist property, then the question must be asked, what can be actually objected to this? 31 In the relations between social-democrats and communists in West Germany, Jens Schultz has observed an irrational component of anti-communism on the part of the SPD. This anti-communism was a reaction to repression that ex-communists who had turned their back on communism experienced in the Soviet zone. To legitimize the need for protection against communists, the social democrats pointed to the cases of emigration, banishment, persecution and detention going on behind the iron curtain. 32 The disrepute of the GDR, combined with restrictive acts by the West German state, resulted in communism being personified as evil itself. In pursuit of their interest in restitution, 29 In order to understand the transfers of communist property before the rise of national socialism, we must retrace the history of the communist printing companies. 34 The German Communists' real estate was owned by the company Bürohaus Vulkan. By 1932, this corporation had no funds left to pay its creditors, which resulted in decrees of foreclosure against its assets. However, its assets were transferred abroad just in time and served to finance the Nazi resistance from exile. The shares of the printing companies themselves were the property of the holding company Papiererzeugungs-und -verwertungs-AG (PEUVAG), which owned the KPD-affiliated printing company in Hannover. The entire property of PEUVAG was gradually transferred to different companies. PEUVAG, along with Bürohaus Vulkan, was liquidated just before the seizure of its assets took place in 1933. By early 1931, some funds had already been transferred to Switzerland, including the equipment of the German communist printing companies. The printing companies became the property of a Swiss company, Diligentia AG. 35 As such, they were assumed to be safe from seizure by the Nazis. In postwar restitution claim litigation, the restitution authorities interpreted this transfer of the KPD's property to its disadvantage, undermining its argument for reparation for Nazi persecution.
The KPD printing company in Hannover, Fortschritt AG Hannover, became part of Diligentia and reflected the pattern of concealment before the Nazi 36 The communist newspaper was no longer printed there, but at the new location. When the companies separated, a number of the printing presses and much of the companies' other equipment were moved to secret locations in order to save them from Nazi confiscation and allow them to print illegal leaflets. Between March and November 1933, the central press organ of the KPD, Die Rote Fahne, was printed in at least six different places. 37 According to details provided by Diligentia representatives to the Restitution Office of Hannover (Wiedergutmachungsamt beim Landgericht Hannover) after the war, printing presses and other equipment with an estimated value of 140,000 RM were saved from confiscation, out of a total estimated value of 190,000 RM. 38 Activities at both the old location on Am Klagesmarkt and the new one on Andertensche Wiese ended in May 1933, when the Nazis seized the property there. 39 In 1951, in view of the Federal Government's claim for a KPD ban in West Germany, it became obvious that no organization would be able to claim restitution for Nazi persecution damages for the KPD. As a reaction to the restrictive practices by the restitution authorities in Hannover, Diligentia combined the restitution claims for the two printing companies into one. 40 The resilient tactic of separating the KPD printing company into two locations prior to May 1933 went unremarked in the restitution process.
Limits on publishing were tightened after 1931 and the printing houses were in a critical economic situation. The communist printing company in Hannover was divided up as part of a larger effort in 1932 to conceal the full extent of the Communists' assets. In Hannover, according to information in the restitution files, the move to two separate locations allowed printing to continue until the 36 42 The conspiracy to conceal their assets allowed the Communists to maintain secret printing places for use in the resistance to Nazism that followed. 43 Based on research into the KPD's restitution claims in Hannover and Diligentia's restitution claims on a federal base, it is estimated that up to three-quarters of the communist printing company's equipment was saved.
In 1933, an unknown percentage of Diligentia's property was confiscated, in total amounting to an estimated value of 6 million RM. This property was effectively confiscated a second time when the FRG rejected Diligentia's claims for reparations. All claims for restitution by the Swiss corporation Diligentia AG were declined for various reasons, most of which were related to the KPD's lack of legal standing in the FRG to claim any compensation for Nazi persecution damages. The arguments of the restitution authorities completely avoided any discussion of the need to right a historic injustice. Restitution policy was influenced more by the political culture of anti-communism than by a desire to rehabilitate victims damaged by Nazi persecution.
In 1933-1938, the German secret police were speculating that the three founders of Diligentia were Swiss communist agents collaborating with the Soviets. Based on the paper record of the Nazi seizure of Diligentia's assets in Germany, the restitution authorities found that the contracts between Diligentia and PEUVAG were shams, entered into in order to conceal the Communists' assets. The founders and shareholders of Diligentia had French and Swiss nationality, and insisted on several occasions that they were not communists. Their names were never made public in spite of the pressure from the Nazis and later from the West German restitution authorities. 44 After twenty years of legal proceedings, Diligentia was finally liquidated in 1968. It waived all its rights to restitution of property with an estimated value of 41 60 million German marks (Deutsche Mark, DM). 45 The same year that Diligentia lost all its rights to restitution in the course of its liquidation, the West German government allowed the German Communist Party to be reconstituted (intentionally under a different name: Deutsche Kommunistische Partei, and not the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands). 46 How much property the Communists had managed to conceal before the KPD was banned in 1956 and was able to save in the course of the liquidation of Diligentia AG remains unknown.
The fate of the SPD printing company, EAH Meister & Co., which was located in Hannover's trade union house, 47 can give us an idea of the interplay between political constellations in the politics of reconciliation after the war. Before the relaxation of Cold War tensions in the 1970s, in light of the historical-political collision between reconciliations on the international and national stages, how flexible were domestic restitution politics?
In April 1933, the Nazis confiscated Meister's building. Thereafter, Meister's printing equipment was used to print Hannover's Nazi newspaper, Niedersäch-sischer Beobachter. In July 1934, the Nazi publishing company NS-Gauverlag Südhannover-Braunschweig GmbH moved out of the trade union house, taking some of the former SPD printing company's equipment to a bigger location at Georgstrasse 30-33. The biggest Nazi newspaper in northern Germany began publishing there. Part of the SPD-owned equipment confiscated from Meister was sold to Nazi publishing companies in other cities or to private printing companies, and printing presses from other German cities were received in exchange at the new location on Georgstrasse in Hannover. In contrast, none of the confiscated communist printing presses remained in Hannover. 48 45 In July 1946, the British Military Government in Hannover began the process of making reparations to the printing companies by officially transferring the premises of the former Nazi newspaper in Georgstrasse to the social-democratic newspaper Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung (HAZ). 49 In 1952-53, without questioning the origin of the property, the reparation authority Allgemeiner Organisationsausschuss Celle (AOA Celle) decreed that the moveable property that remained in the Georgstrasse location would also be transferred to HAZ, which had been legally recognized as the successor of the suppressed printing company Meister & Co. 50 Among the printing equipment of the former Nazi newspaper that was transferred to HAZ was one printing press formerly belonging to the communist newspaper Rote Fahne. By agreement with the British military government, the trustee holding the property confiscated from the Nazi publishing company NS-Gauverlag Südhannover-Braunschweig GmbH was authorized to turn the Communists' former property over to HAZ, without regard to Military Law No. 52. The local reparation authorities in Hannover considered this transfer to be required by the mandatory regulatory act of the British military government, precluding the Communists' right to restitution. 51 A bitter twenty-year fight between the SPD and KPD printing companies over what was in fact an old, useless printing press was ended by the forgery of a serial number on the press. It remained SPD property. 52 Besides the restitution of its so-called identifiable property, the SPD in Hannover was granted compensation of 1.125 million DM in 1968 for the deprivation of its right to publish its newspaper. 53 The transfer of the shares of the SPD-linked Konzentration AG to the Swiss company Züricher AG für Zeitungsunternehmungen, shortly before the Nazi confiscation, was described in postwar official discourse as a failed attempt at resistance to the Nazis. The transfer of the SPD's financial reserves, estimated at 1-2 million RM, allowed the exiled SPD board of directors, SOPADE, to pursue political opposition to the Nazis. 57 In contrast to the restitution claims of Diligentia, the SPD's concealing of assets is not discussed in the post-World War II restitution proceedings. Its transfers of funds and their exact amounts remain secret. 58 Behind the scenes of the restitution proceedings involving the political parties that are analyzed in this paper stand negotiations to restore the destroyed relationships between the SPD and KPD, which were so-called collective actors in West German post-World War II society. The controversies in these negotiations are symbolic of the escalation of post-World War II Cold War conflicts. They reveal how historical guilt and dissenting opinions of the former labor movement organizations were suppressed in West Germany.
Based on evaluation of critical sources, I have found evidence supporting the assumption that during the post-World War II rehabilitation of the pre-war German labor movement organizations in West Germany, restitution was used to promote one particular discourse above all others. 54 The total compensation included nearly 1 million DM in interest. See Reparation files, Collection B126-68611, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 55 
III. Memory Politics: Post-History vs. Restitution
In the second part of this paper, contextualization of restitution policy is required in order to illustrate the wider societal conditions in which West Germany's proceedings to correct past wrongs took place. Elazar Barkan states that the modern concept of restitution was born from the unique need in West Germany to reestablish the country's political and moral legitimacy after World War II. 59 Consequently, in West Germany, the legal process of restitution for the crimes committed under Nazism led to new possibilities for international relationships. Under U.S. influence, Germany's efforts to reconcile German-Israeli relations included the payment of reparations and are considered today by many to be exemplary. 60 In contrast, restitution for the domestic political resistance to the Nazis was neglected in West Germany. Its rehabilitation on the international scene had priority. A strategic realignment of the young FRG's rehabilitation policies was required. 61 The year 1948 marked a break in the solidarity between the two formerly politically persecuted victims of national socialism, the SPD and KPD. The SPD's rejection of any prospect of an alliance with the KPD meant that members of the SPD could not join the Organization of Persecuted Victims of the Nazi Regime (Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Nazi Regimes, VVN). 62 Partly influenced by the rising tide of anti-communism in America and partly by internal conflicts in West German society, the VVN was accused of being a communist 59 In hindsight, the forced admission of war guilt at Versailles undermined the chances for reconciliation. Therefore, after World War II, the innovative phenomenon was that there was no longer a demand for reparations against Germany as the perpetrator of war and war crimes, which facilitated its self-rehabilitation through compensating its victims of its own volition. organization infiltrating Soviet influence into West Germany. 63 The two victims of political persecution by the Nazis were separated by the reality of politics. In fact, there was little respect for the multi-vocality of the German victims of Nazi persecution and their experiences of resistance in the West German Society. By distancing itself from the KPD, the SPD imported the border between East and West Germany into West German restitution policy.
In the early 1950s, German Minister of Justice Thomas Dehler asserted: "We must sacrifice one freedom in order to guarantee liberty." 64 This idea led to a national policy called "amnesty and amnesia." 65 This policy was introduced by the first post-World War II West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, and effectively supported reintegration of the former Nazi elite. 66 In 1954, an amnesty law known as the Straffreiheitsgesetz marked the end of the denazification carried out under the allied occupation forces. The law permitted the rehabilitation of roughly 400,000 persons. 67 In practice, their rehabilitation devalued the acts of resistance of the Nazis' German victims. Former NSDAP members were allowed back into public office and various positions in the public service, while KPD members and their so-called sympathizers were removed from those positions. Paradoxically, in the propagandistic fight for Germans' allegiance, West German reconciliation policies served the GDR as another instrument of propaganda and indoctrination.
The denazification process pushed its boundaries when it became obvious that nearly all German citizens were somehow tainted by Nazism. The political scientist Eugen Kogon described the problem, stating: "You can only kill them or win them." In the young FRG, this meant that former members of the Nazi elite and their collaborators were amnestied and successfully reintegrated into society. According to the historian Norbert Frei, the politics of post-history were a form of resocialization that created a secure inner distance that West Germans enjoyed with regard to the ideology of national socialism. 68 Furthermore, for many Germans, the silence of large parts of the population that had suffered under Nazism facilitated forgetting and the displacement of memory.
In this atmosphere of denial and inability to mourn, 69 the emphasis shifted from the real need for denazification to anti-communism. Politically active communists were disqualified from holding public service positions, from the institutions administering reparations and from making restitution policy. This was supported by the construction of anti-communism internationally. Even before the German Federal Government demanded a ban on the KPD in the Federal Constitutional Court in November 1951, the first political measures leading up to the ban, such as the Adenauererlass, were introduced. 70 Later, in 1956, the Federal Constitutional Court declared that the KPD was an organization fighting against German democracy. 71 That declaration still forms the legal basis for the post-World War II confiscation of an unknown amount of the property of West German communist organizations. 72 The restitution claims that were retracted in the aftermath of the KPD ban cannot be raised again. Even in 2014, referring to the principle of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary, the German Federal Government still felt no reason to question the ban on the KPD or support the political, social and legal rehabilitation of persons affected by the Radikalenerlass. 73 After the KPD was officially banned in 1956, between 125,000 and 200,000 preliminary investigations of its members were opened and 7,000 to 10,000 convictions handed down. Furthermore, an unknown number of communists who continued their political activity were obliged to return money they had received as compensation for damages caused to them by Nazi persecution. This result can be traced back to a court decision codified in Article 6 of the Federal Reparation Law (Bundesentschädigungsgesetz, BEG). This law, which is still in force today, denied restitution not only to former members of the NSDAP but also to anyone in the FRG who was accused of having fought against the re-establishment of the liberal democratic order. National socialism and communism were both considered totalitarian ideologies that were consubstantial for purposes of the statute. 74 After the issuance of the Radikalenerlass in West Germany in February 1972, Article 3 of the German Basic Law, mandating equal treatment of all persons regardless of religion, national origin or political orientation, had no application in practice any more. 75 In West Germany, this fundamental principle of human rights was abrogated in view of the danger of dictatorship. Many, including European human rights organizations, identified its disregard as a human rights violation. 76 The Radikalenlass now represents the most widely known symbol of the oppression of voices critical of the system in West Germany.
Twenty-two years after the closure of restitution proceedings concerning the KPD and SPD organizations, in 1990, the Prime Minister of Lower Saxony, Gerhard Schröder, nullified the Radikalenerlass in his state. In 1995, when the parliament of Lower Saxony belatedly decreed payment of a compensatory pension to victims of Nazi persecution, recompense to the communists, as the double victims of Nazi and postwar oppression, seemed possible. However, the state government of Lower Saxony rejected this idea. 77 Another 22 years later, in February 2017, the state government of Lower Saxony offered an apology to persons affected by the Berufsverbote that were issued in pursuance of the Radikalenerlass. In so acknowledging its error, the state government honored the suffering of the persons concerned. However, it still remains to establish a legal basis for compensating them.
At the time the Radikalenerlass was decreed, Willi Brandt, in 1970, performed his kneeling down in front of the monument to the victims of the Warsaw Uprising. Today, Brandt's gesture is considered a symbol of Ostpolitik. Dogmatic policies were relaxed. Rapprochement with the GDR and other East European countries led to the turmoil of 1989. The moral import of Brandt's gesture, which marked the first thawing of the Cold War, was at the time an exceptional signal that Germans recognized their own crimes. Brandt's act of apology received more attention internationally than domestically. 78 When Brandt, who paradoxically was a former member of the anti-Nazi resistance, fell on his knees in Warsaw, a descendant of German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, the progenitor of the Anti-Socialist Laws of the nineteenth century, stood in the first row behind him. In view of German crimes against humanity and the desire to expiate them, did this constellation of personages indicate a normative transition by the West German left wing toward conservatism?
Brandt's act of reconciliation was in fact a denial of the anti-Nazi resistance experience. The marginality of the domestic West German Nazi resistance members and their descendants is reflected in the KPD vs. SPD restitution case study analyzed here. After Brandt's Kniefall, those who demanded acknowledgment of their Nazi resistance experiences gave up the battle. 79 Paradoxically, by devaluing the domestic resistance experience, righting past wrongs became feasible in West Germany. Somehow, the gap between the former Nazi resistance members and the followers of the NSDAP had to be closed. The interests of the social-democratic resistance members were subordinated to the interests of the SPD leadership. 80 As indicated by the results of the restitution proceedings, the pursuit of these interests influenced the reconciliation policies of the West German left.
Those policies first began to change at the end of the 1970s, after the importance of the social-democratic resistance was pointed out by numerous research projects. 81 The transition from repairing international relations through reparations to silencing the voices of the domestic resistance is evidence of the clash between the international and the domestic politics of reconciliation. Rigoll underlines that in collective therapy for Nazi regime sympathizers, stories of collaborators, perpetrators and victims were regularly constrained by the limits of the "sayable." 82 The historical limits of the thinkable and "sayable" seem quite analogous to the limits of what can be remembered by society in the form of the politics of reconciliation.
IV. Concluding Remarks
In the late 1960s, the pre-World War II German labor movement's claims to restitution tested West Germany's politics of reconciliation. German restitution law did not apply to the formerly suppressed KPD printing companies in West Germany, whereas damage from Nazi persecution to similar SPD organizations was largely acknowledged, as investigation of the restitution claims in Hannover has shown. As part of the postwar devaluing of the domestic Nazi resistance, the resilience experiences of the left wing were effectively left out of the hegemonic political canon.
Barkan underlines that the precondition for restitution arrangements is reciprocity. 83 In this specific case, the left's self-denial enabled the political conflicts of the German-German cold civil war to influence the disposition and redistribution of resources originally seized by the Nazis. The strategic alignment of West Germany with anti-communist forces in the political constellation during the East-West conflict guided internal reconciliation policy. That policy was further aided and abetted by silence about the history of the domestic resistance. Ambivalent relations with the past required successive revisions and the development of new perspectives that were supported by the gradual suppression of history. 81 Meyer, Die SPD und die NS-Vergangenheit. 82 Dominik Rigoll, "Grenzen des Sagbaren, NS-Belastung, und NS-Verfolgungserfahrung bei Bundestagsabgeordneten," Parlamentsfragen 45 (2014): 128. 83 Barkan, The Guilt of Nations, 86-87.
The intergenerational dialogue was warped by miscommunication. This was perceived as an opportunity by the anti-communists, who took advantage of it to impose socially stigmatizing measures like the Berufsverbote. The limits on what was "sayable" in the context of the historic burden of German-German miscommunication about the past, and the subjugation of discourse to the dominant view, have been made obvious in recent efforts to redress the effects of the Radikalenerlass. The opposing memories of the persons harmed by the Berufsverbote are tools for resisting former totalizing perspectives.
As Jacques Derrida stated, the task of the so-called "new International" 84 is to produce specific critiques of the nation, the state, international law 85 and as needed, reconciliation politics. However, in searching for a different historical understanding of Marxism, Derrida seeks to be "anti-political" -a stance that Czech President Václav Havel also sought to read into history. 86 The specter of life in a shared utopia and all its elements that might serve to emancipate the people is set up in opposition to the documented repressions of communism. In that sense, recent nationwide discourse in Germany about the Berufsverbote indicates the existence of conscious, unfinished business, which is being re-evaluated. Does this controversial attempt at reconciliation reveal a counter-voluntary desire to come to terms with left wing trauma arising from the German-German past?
Further historical research on specific regional restitution cases and the history of anti-Nazi resistance and subversion would help to explain the impulse for conciliatory engagement within the contemporary German left wing, i.e. those most affected by the Berufsverbote, and would help to support the premise of this paper.
